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Abstract
It is often objected that the Everett interpretation of QM cannot make
sense of quantum probabilities, in one or both of two ways: either it can’t
make sense of probability at all, or it can’t explain why probability should
be governed by the Born rule. David Deutsch has attempted to meet these
objections. He argues not only that rational decision under uncertainty
makes sense in the Everett interpretation, but also that under reasonable
assumptions, the credences of a rational agent in an Everett world should
be constrained by the Born rule.
David Wallace has developed and defended Deutsch’s proposal, and
greatly clarified its conceptual basis. In particular, he has stressed its
reliance on the distinguishing symmetry of the Everett view, viz., that all
possible outcomes of a quantum measurement are treated as equally real.
The argument thus tries to make a virtue of what has usually been seen
as the main obstacle to making sense of probability in the Everett world.
In this note I outline some objections to the Deutsch-Wallace argu-
ment, and to related proposals by Hilary Greaves about the epistemology
of Everettian QM. (In the latter case, my arguments include an appeal
to an Everettian analogue of the Sleeping Beauty problem.) The com-
mon thread to these objections is that the symmetry in question remains
a very significant obstacle to making sense of probability in the Everett
interpretation.
1 Preamble
It is often objected that the Everett view of quantum theory cannot make ad-
equate sense of quantum probabilities, in one or both of two senses: either it
cannot make sense of probability at all, or cannot explain why probability should
∗This note is prompted by several recent papers by David Wallace and Hilary Greaves. I
hope it will be clear to readers who know those papers that while I focus (of course) on aspects
of Wallace’s and Greaves’s arguments that I find problematic, I’m very much indebted to their
discussions, which greatly clarify the issue of probability in the Everett world.
†Centre for Time, Department of Philosophy, Main Quad A14, University of Sydney, NSW
2006, Australia. E-mail: huw@mail.usyd.edu.au.
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be governed by the Born rule. David Deutsch (1999) has attempted to meet
these objections. He argues not only that rational decision under uncertainty (of
the kind traditionally associated with probability) makes sense in the Everett
interpretation; but also that under reasonable assumptions, the credences of a
rational agent in an Everett world should be constrained by the Born rule.
In two recent papers (2003, 2005b), David Wallace has developed and de-
fended Deutsch’s proposal, and greatly clarified its conceptual basis. In this
note, however, I want to outline some concerns about the latest form of the
Deutsch-Wallace (DW) argument, and related matters. In particular, I want to
argue that the argument is circular, at a crucial point. Similar objections have
been raised to various other proposals to derive meaningful probabilities in the
Everett context. The present objection is related to reservations about the DW
argument expressed by Barnum et al (2000) and by Lewis (2003, 2005), though
I think it develops these reservations in a new and more forceful way.
Most of my concerns turn on a feature of the Everett view that Wallace
takes to be crucial to the DW argument. As he notes, the argument is based on
symmetry considerations. He argues that it is stronger than the usual kind of
symmetry-based attempts to derive probabilities, because the symmetry isn’t
broken by a single actual outcome (which, if one knew it, would trump the
symmetry-based probabilities as a guide to action). Here is Wallace’s own sum-
mary of the point from another paper:
I will not attempt to summarise these decision-theoretic proofs here,
since the details are somewhat involved, but the underlying princi-
ple is essentially that of symmetry: if there is a physical symmetry
between two possible outcomes there can be no reason to prefer
one to another. Such arguments have frequently been advanced in
non-quantum contexts but ultimately fall foul of the problem that
the symmetry is broken by one outcome rather than another actually
happening (leading to a requirement for probability to be introduced
explicitly at the level either of the initial conditions or of the dynam-
ics to select which one happens). They find their natural home –
and succeed! – in Everettian quantum mechanics, where all out-
comes occur and there is no breaking of the symmetry. (Wallace,
2005a, §3.6)
As I’ll explain below, I have two main concerns related to this feature of the
model. Together, these concerns suggest that this supposed advantage is at best
two-edged: the source of the symmetry is also the source of the deepest reasons
for scepticism about the fate of probability in the Everett interpretation.
I think that the concerns I am going to identify also create difficulties for
Hilary Greaves’s proposed interpretation of Everettian probabilities (Greaves
2004). However, I shall be relying on Greaves’s discussion and conclusions in
other ways. In particular, I follow Greaves in rejecting what Wallace refers to as
the Subjective-uncertainty (SU) viewpoint. Wallace characterises this viewpoint
as follows:
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Given that what it is to have a future self is to be appropriately
related to a certain future person, and that in normal circumstances
I expect to become my future self, so also in Everettian splittings I
should expect to become one of my future selves. If there is more
than one of them I should be uncertain as to which I will become;
furthermore, this subjective uncertainty is compatible with my total
knowledge of the wavefunction and its dynamics. (2005b, §2)
The arguments Greaves presents against this viewpoint seem to me to be con-
vincing, but for present purposes I shall simply presuppose that she is right.
Wallace himself considers the possibility that SU might have to be rejected – he
calls the alternative Objective-determinism (OD) – and my objections focus on
the version of the DW argument he takes to be relevant in that case.
2 First concern
A standard difficulty for symmetry-based probabilities is that different ways
of carving up the relevant space of possible outcomes may yield different sym-
metries and hence different probabilities. In the classical case, there’s scope
to argue that one particular carve-up is to be preferred, precisely because it
does yield assessments of probability that match the observed long(ish) run fre-
quencies. But that response is off the menu, in the Everett case, for the very
reason that’s supposed to constitute the advantage, viz., that there is no unique
outcome or observed frequency.
So the “multiple carve-up” problem would seem to be serious, for the DW
argument, if other carve-ups were available. As Greaves (2004, §5.2) notes, one
other possibility might seem to be what she calls the “Egalitarian” proposal,
which accords equal weight to all branches. In my view, Greaves is right about
the problem this alternative would pose, if it were a genuine alternative. For-
tunately for the DW argument, and as Greaves explains, it turns out not to be
a serious possibility, for reasons to do with decoherence and the approximate
nature of branches, amongst other things.1
Still, the lesson seems to be that the DW argument would have trouble with
the multiple carve-up problem, if Egalitarianism about branches were a live
option – if we shifted to a model in which branches were more sharply defined,
as it were (and of some tractable cardinality, perhaps).2
1As Wallace puts it, ‘The point . . . is not that there is no precise way to define the number
of descendants . . . . Rather, the point is that there is not even an approximate way to make
such a definition.’ (Wallace, 2005b, §9; see also Greaves 2004, §5.3)
2It is worth emphasising that what is excluded by this consideration is Egalitarianism about
branches. A different view would be Egalitarianism about outcomes – i.e., the view that for
decision purposes we should accord equal weight to all the outcomes to which the Born rule
ascribes non-zero probability. The lack of ‘even an approximate way’ to define the number of
descendants is bad news for branch-Egalitarianism, but excellent news, at least prima facie,
for outcome-Egalitarianism – for it suggests that among all the kinds of futures to which the
Everett world commits us, there is no sense in which some occur “more often” than others.
What better reason, surely, for treating them all on a par, for decision purposes? It is true
3
If this is correct, it also seems to imply that the DW argument has similar
trouble, if anyone can propose some reasonably elegant alternative to the Born
rule as a rule weighting branches. If there’s such alternative available, then it
can’t be true that it is uniquely rational to assign one’s credences according
to the Born rule – after all, the same symmetry argument, starting with the
alternative weights, would show that it is uniquely rational to use those weights,
instead.
In her survey of these issues, Greaves (2004) suggests that we might turn
this point around – with branch- Egalitarianism off the menu, the Born rule
might be the only non-trivial option available:
The failure of Egalitarianism (section 5.2) raises an important ques-
tion: are there any coherent rationality strategies that are at all
plausible and that also violate the Born rule? If not, we may hope
to . . . defend the Born rule by sheer process of elimination. (2004,
§5.4.2)
Greaves goes on to argue that no reasonable alternative is available: ‘It does
seem that the only way we can come up with an [alternative] strategy is by brute
force: that is, by specifying a preference ordering over Acts on a case-by-case
basis, without appeal to any general governing rationale.’
On the face of it, however, there’s an easy way to produce such alternatives:
just use the weights provided by the Born rule itself, applied to a different
initial state vector. This could be done in a systematic way, apparently: we
could imagine someone – call her Heretic – whose rule was that you started
with the state vector |ψ〉, applied some given operator Ôdd, and then used the
Born rule on the resulting state vector |ψ′〉 = Ôdd |ψ〉.
This may sound like a trivial suggestion. After all (it might be objected), the
DW claim is only that if you know the initial state vector, then your rational
credences are uniquely constrained. Of course it follows that if we postulate a
different initial state vector, we’ll infer different rational credences.
But this misses the point of the objection. At the moment, what is at issue
is the validity of the DW inference from a set of assumed weights to rational
credences. We’ve seen that inference is challenged by the possibility of ‘multiple
carve-ups’ – different ways of assigning weights to branches or sets of branches.
We repel one specific such challenge, by dismissing branch- Egalitarianism, but
the DW inference remains vulnerable to the general objection. And the present
that if we want to treat outcomes “disjunctively”, dividing some finite measure between them,
then it is difficult to say what counts as an outcome – there are many alternative ways to
partition the results of a measurement, in general. But as Peter Lewis has pointed out to me,
this isn’t a problem if we treat outcomes “conjunctively”, taking seriously the idea that the
implication of the Everett view is precisely that all possible outcomes are certain to occur. In
this case, we assign weight 1 to all outcomes, and it doesn’t matter how we partition them. In
this sense at least, then, Egalitarianism does seem to remain in play – an alternative decision
policy whose exclusion needs to be justified, by a decision-based defence of the Born rule in
the Everett context.
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point is that the QM formalism itself seems to generate alternative weightings
ad nauseum, simply by considering alternative initial states.3
2.1 The case against equivalence
How do these considerations affect the DW argument? In Wallace’s most recent
development of the argument in (Wallace 2005b), a principle he calls equiva-
lence plays a crucial role. The objection outlined above appears to undermine
the DW argument at precisely this point – in other words, it undermines equiv-
alence.
As Wallace explains (2005b, §6), ‘Equivalence has the form of a principle
of pure rationality: it dictates that any agent who does not regard equally-
weighted events as equally likely is in some sense being irrational.’ He offers
an argument for equivalence, which, as he stresses, makes essential use of the
Everett interpretation:
I wish to argue that the Everett interpretation necessarily plays a
central role in any such defence [of equivalence]: in other inter-
pretations, equivalence is not only unmotivated as a rationality
principle but is actually absurd.†
Why? Observe what equivalence actually claims: that if we
know that two events have the same weight, then we must regard
them as equally likely regardless of any other information we may
have about them. Put another way, if we wish to determine which
3We might want to impose a minimal consistency constraint, to the effect that the same
branches receive non-zero weighting in the alternative state |ψ′〉 as in the original state |ψ〉.
Howard Barnum has pointed out to me that it isn’t possible to meet this constraint in a
perfectly general way. In an unpublished paper (Barnum, 1990) in which he considers a
similar “shuffling” of the state vector, he shows that there is no non-trivial mapping Ôdd that
my Heretic could use which preserves the extremal properties – viz., that the weight attached
to a measurement result corresponding to an eigenvector orthogonal to the state must be zero,
and that attached to getting a result corresponding to an eigenvector proportional to the state
must be one. But Heretic could avoid this difficulty, presumably, by the simple expedient of
announcing that her alternative recipe applies only in the cases in which the measurement in
question is not extremal, in this sense, for either |ψ〉 or |ψ′〉. As we’ll see below, the question
is really in what sense it could be rational to be guided by one quantum state rather than the
other, in the Everett framework. To the extent that this is a serious issue, it seems bad enough
if it only “bites” in non-extremal cases. (Adam Elga has suggested to me an alternative way
of dealing with the extremal cases, which he reports he heard from Frank Arntzenius: ‘don’t
identify “zero amplitude” with“does not occur”. In other words, think of things so that even
when a term in the preferred-basis-expansion of a state has amplitude zero, there is a branch
associated with that term. It’s just a zero-weight branch – cf. the notion of a zero-mass
particle.’)
†[Wallace’s footnote] “In this section I confine my observations to those interpretations
of quantum mechanics which are in some sense “realist” and observer-independent (such as
collapse theories or hidden-variable theories). I will not consider interpretations (such as the
Copenhagen interpretation, or the recent variant defended by Fuchs and Peres 2000) which
take a more ‘operationalist’ approach to the quantum formalism. It is entirely possible, as has
been argued recently by Saunders (200[4]), that an approach based on Deutsch’s proof may
be useful in these interpretations.”
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event to bet on and we are told that they have the same weight, we
will be uninterested in any other information about them.
But in any interpretation which does not involve branching —
that is, in any non-Everettian interpretation — there is a further
piece of information that cannot but be relevant to our choice:
namely, which event is actually going to happen? If in fact we know
that E rather than F will actually occur, of course we will bet on
E, regardless of the relative weights of the events. (Wallace 2005b,
§6)
Wallace’s central argument for equivalence goes as follows:
In fact, a very simple and direct justification of equivalence is
available. Consider, for simplicity, a Stern-Gerlach experiment . . . :
an atom is prepared in a superposition |+x〉 = 1√
2
(|+z〉 + |−z〉)
and then measured along the z axis. According to the result of the
measurement, an agent receives some payoff. Ex hypothesi the agent
is indifferent per se to what goes on during the measurement process
and to what the actual outcome of the experiment is; all he cares
about is the payoff.
We now consider two possible games (that is, associations of
payoffs with outcomes):
Game 1: The agent receives the payoff iff the result is spin up.
Game 2: The agent receives the payoff iff the result is spin down.
In each game, the weight of the branch where the agent receives the
payoff is 0.5; equivalence, in this context, is then the claim that
the agent is indifferent between games 1 and 2.
To see that this is indeed the case, we need to model the games
explicitly. Let |‘up’;reward〉 and |‘down’; no reward〉 be the quantum
states of the two branches on the assumption that game 1 was played:
that is, let the post-game global state† if game 1 is played be
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|‘up’;reward〉+ |‘down’; no reward〉). (1)
Similarly, if game 2 is played then the quantum state is
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|‘down’;reward〉+ |‘up’; no reward〉). (2)
Why should an agent be indifferent between a physical process which
produces |ψ1〉 and one which produces |ψ2〉?
Well, recall that the agent is indifferent per se to the result of the
experiment. This being the case, he will not object if we erase that
†[Wallace’s footnote] “More precisely: the global state relative to the pre-game agent: there
are of course all manner of other branches which are already effectively disconnected from the
agent’s branch.”
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result. Let |‘erased’,reward〉 indicate the state of the branch in which
the reward was given post-erasure and |‘erased’,no reward〉 the post-
erasure state of the no-reward branch. Then (game 1+erasure) leads
to the state
|ψ1;e〉 = 1√
2
(|‘erased’,reward〉+ |‘erased’,no reward〉) (3)
and (game 2+erasure) to the state
|ψ2;e〉 = 1√
2
(|‘erased’,reward〉+ |‘erased’,no reward〉) (4)
— that is, (game 1+erasure) and (game 2+erasure) lead to the same
state. If (game 1+erasure) and (game 2+erasure) are just different
ways of producing the same physical state — different ways, more-
over, which can be made to differ only over a period of a fraction
of a second, in which the agent has no interest — then the agent
should be indifferent between the two. Since he is also indifferent
to erasure, he is indifferent between games 1 and 2, as required by
equivalence. (Wallace 2005b, §9)
Against this background, consider our Heretic. Suppose for the sake of argu-
ment that while agreeing that the initial state of the atom is the superposition
|ψ〉 = |+x〉 = 1√
2
(|+z〉 + |−z〉), she weights the branches for decision theory
purposes as if it were |ψ′〉 = 1√
3
|+z〉 +
√
2√
3
|−z〉. (In other words, she assigns
subjective probabilities in the way that an Orthodox person would, following
Wallace’s principle equivalence, if the initial state were actually |ψ′〉.)
Clearly, Heretic will prefer Game 2 to Game 1, and will be (rightly) unmoved
by the consideration that once the chosen game is over, thanks to erasure, she
will be unable to tell whether it was actually Game 1 or Game 2 that was
played. In one sense, of course, she is equally happy to win by either path. But
she thinks she is twice as likely to win by Game 2 as by Game 1, so she should
not weight them equally, for decision purposes, contra equivalence.
This means that unless it has already been assumed, implicitly, that rational
choice is constrained by the Born rule, then it is perfectly possible to make sense
of someone who violates equivalence. At least, it is possible to do so modulo
the assumption that rational choice of this kind makes sense at all, in the Everett
context, but DW can hardly dispute that assumption, in this context.
To put it another way, the objection seems to establish the following: if
we assume that rational choice under uncertainty makes sense in the Everett
context, and don’t assume what we are trying to establish – viz., that rational
choice should be guided by probabilities derived from the Born rule – then it is
easy to make sense of a rational agent whose (symmetry-driven) credences differ
from those assigned by the Born rule, and violate equivalence.
So the multiple carve-up problem seems to be a real difficulty. It is no help
knowing the real initial state vector, because the symmetry argument that is
7
supposed to justify the Born rule is already undermined by the existence of
alternative carve-ups. What would be needed would be some primitive assump-
tion to the effect that carve-up given by the real state vector was privileged.
However, this seems to amount to assuming by fiat what the DW argument was
supposed to show.
In fact, the consequences may be even worse than this. If the DW argu-
ment worked, it would seem to establish not only the Born rule, but also, more
basically, the coherence of rational decision under uncertainty in the Everett
context. If the objection above is correct in claiming that the Born rule is effec-
tively assumed as a primitive in the DW argument, then the effect isn’t simply
to undermine the claim to have derived the Born rule; it is to challenge the co-
herence of rational decision in an Everett world, in a fairly precise sense. What
it challenges is the idea that there could be any rational basis for choosing be-
tween the weights associated with alternative initial state vectors, as one’s guide
to such decisions.4
The upshot seems to be something like this: in the Everett context we can
make sense of a minimal coherence condition of the kind provided by Dutch
book argument – failing which, apparently, an agent can be made to be worse
off in all future branches.5 But there seems to be no basis for any rational
preference between credences beyond that – no reason for choosing one initial
state vector rather than another, as it were, if one’s weightings are to be given
by the Born rule.
If this is correct, then even the proposal to assume the Born rule as a prim-
itive (as recommended by Greaves 2004, for example) seems to be in trouble.
We have not been told what the content of such an assumption would be –
what it would be for the assumption to be correct, or what difference it makes.
It is no use saying that its content consists precisely in the way that it guides
our choices in cases of decision under uncertainty. The point is that we haven’t
been given any understanding of what difference those choices make (within the
circle of the alternatives permitted by coherence in the minimal sense); or of
what it could amount to for the assignment according to the Born rule to be
the “right” assignment.
Another way to put this is to say that if the link between the quantum
amplitudes and decision probabilities is taken as primitive, then we lack an
sense as to how there could be a single, correct initial state vector, in a given
situation. It doesn’t seem to be helpful to say that this is simply a postulate
of the theory. When we have real frequencies of outcomes, we have some sense
of what correctness might mean. Here, the point is that this sense seems to
have gone missing. All possibilities seem to be on a par (extremal cases aside,
perhaps).
It is natural to think that if we are to find a solution to this problem, we will
4At least within the scope of the variation permitted by the considerations noted in fn. 3
above.
5Though it is worth asking to what extent these arguments themselves depend on the
assumption that well-informed agents can make sense of choice of betting quotients, in the
Everett context.
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need to look to the epistemology of the Everett model – at this point, surely,
we should hope to find something that will distinguish alternative hypotheses
about the initial state. My second concern, below, focusses on this issue. Before
coming to that, however, I want to raise another issue about Wallace’s argument
for equivalence.
2.2 Same-State Rational Indifference
As we have seen, Wallace’s argument for equivalence relies on an argument
which first appears in this passage:
[R]ecall that the agent is indifferent per se to the result of the ex-
periment. This being the case, he will not object if we erase that
result. Let |‘erased’,reward〉 indicate the state of the branch in which
the reward was given post-erasure and |‘erased’,no reward〉 the post-
erasure state of the no-reward branch. Then (game 1+erasure) leads
to the state
|ψ1;e〉 = 1√
2
(|‘erased’,reward〉+ |‘erased’,no reward〉) (5)
and (game 2+erasure) to the state
|ψ2;e〉 = 1√
2
(|‘erased’,reward〉+ |‘erased’,no reward〉) (6)
— that is, (game 1+erasure) and (game 2+erasure) lead to the same
state. If (game 1+erasure) and (game 2+erasure) are just different
ways of producing the same physical state — different ways, more-
over, which can be made to differ only over a period of a fraction
of a second, in which the agent has no interest — then the agent
should be indifferent between the two. Since he is also indifferent
to erasure, he is indifferent between games 1 and 2, as required by
equivalence. (Wallace 2005b, §9)
Let’s focus on the principle appealed to in this passage, which we might formalise
as follows:
Same-State Rational Indifference (SSRI): A rational agent should be in-
different between two options that give rise to the same global state (rel-
ative to the pre-game agent).
In the previous subsection, we saw how our agent Heretic seemed to have
grounds for rejecting SSRI: believing she had a better chance of winning via
Game 2 than Game 1, she prefers Game 2, despite the fact that the two games
lead to (effectively) the same global final state. The point I want to make now
is that Heretic’s case illustrates a general reason why SSRI must be rejected, by
anyone who wants to make sense of (some analogue of) rational decision under
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uncertainty, in an Everett world. If a rational agent’s pre-game preferences are
constrained by the global final state in this way, she is bound to be indifferent
between the possible (local, in-branch) outcomes of the game or measurement
in question, because all of them reflect the same global final state.
SSRI thus ensures that a rational Everettian agent is indifferent between the
possible outcomes of any bet whatsoever (once the die is cast, at any rate)! This
may be a prescription for a certain (Buddhist) sort of contentment, but it seems
to be a reductio of the attempt to apply the decision calculus to the Everett
world. Without differential preferences between outcomes, betting behaviour
cannot track credences. As it stands, then, SSRI seems to be a “home-goal” for
the project of making sense of rational decision in the Everett context.
Does Wallace’s argument for equivalence actually require SSRI? The ob-
vious thought is that we might avoid it by arguing for the required indifference
between Game 1 and Game 2 not in terms of the equivalence of the global states
resulting from each game, but in terms of the pairwise equivalence of the two
possible outcomes of each game. Thus, modifying Wallace’s terminology in the
obvious way, we would argue that the agent should be indifferent between the
post-erasure winning outcomes of Game 1 and Game 2, viz., |‘erased’,reward〉1
and |‘erased’,reward〉2, respectively; and also between the corresponding losing
outcomes, |‘erased’,no reward〉1 and |‘erased’,no reward〉2, respectively.
At this point, we want to conclude that the agent should hence be indifferent
between Game 1 and Game 2. However, it seems obvious that this depends on
the very matter at issue: namely, whether the agent should assign equal weight,
for such decision purposes, to the two different measurement outcomes on which
success depends, in the two versions of the game.
In essence, then, it seems to me that Wallace’s argument seeks to avoid
circularity by moving to the “global” level; but that at that level it invokes a
principle (SSRI) which defeats the general project of making sense of rational
decision under uncertainty in the Everett world.6
3 Second concern
As I noted above, it is natural to think that if we are to find a solution of what I
termed the multiple carve-up problem, we will need to look to the epistemology
of the Everett model. It is at this point that we might hope to find something
to distinguish alternative hypotheses about the initial state. But this brings me
to my second concern.
Suppose I accept the Everett model. Whatever outcome of a quantum mea-
surement I observe in “my” branch, I should believe that each of the other
possible outcomes has occurred in some other branch. In other words, I should
take it that what I have observed is only one part or aspect of the overall out-
come of the process in question. Doesn’t the principle of total evidence require
me to take that into account, at this point? If so, then – in the absence of any
further facts about relative frequencies of the various outcomes – there seems to
6This doesn’t imply that the SSRI isn’t defensible in the Everett context, of course.
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be no way in which the evidence can confirm any particular hypothesis about
the relative weights of the various branches. For the total evidence (in this
sense) is exactly the same in all cases. (In a sense, this appeals to a kind of
epistemological analogue of SSRI.)
It might be objected that this argument ignores the indexical component in
“my” evidence, and especially my normal entitlement to regard myself as typical
– this entitlement, the objector would say, enables “me” to infer something
further about the total evidence, viz., that it is likely to be similar to the evidence
“I” actually have. But the notion of typicality rests on frequency comparisons.
If such comparisons don’t make sense in the Everett world, as Wallace and
Greaves maintain, this response seems to be off the agenda.
3.1 Greaves on Everettian epistemology
Greaves herself offers a defence of the epistemology of the Everett model. Her
argument is based on the distinctive interpretation she proposes of the Born
probabilities, as the weightings that a rational agent should give to the interests
of each of her multiple descendants in an Everett world – as she puts it, the
Born probabilities provide a ‘caring measure’.
On the face of it, this proposal encounters the difficulty identified above: if
the practical significance of the state vector is to be linked to a caring measure in
this way, we are entitled to ask what it means for one particular state to be the
“correct” state – how does the ontology of the Everett picture make caring mea-
sure better than another. (Again, a single-history ontology has some prospect
of an answer in terms of actual frequencies, but that option isn’t available here.)
Greaves’s proposal, in effect, is that we can get the constraint we need from
epistemology. She argues that the “caring” framework provides a close analogue
of conditionalization, sufficient to ensure we have good reason to afford high
credence to the conventional quantum state ascriptions, given the abundance
of experimental evidence already accumulated. In her own words, she proposes
that ‘a fairly strong case can be made for the following philosophical conjecture:
If the rational Everettian cares about her future successors in propor-
tion to their relative amplitude-squared measures, then (given our
actual experimental data) she should regard (Everettian) quantum
mechanics as empirically confirmed.’ (2004, §2.3)
If this argument succeeds, it represents progress. It provides an epistemological
sense in which a particular initial quantum state might reasonably be privileged
– regarded as distinctively “correct” – by observers in our situation. With that
sense in place, it might be argued that the Orthodox proposal to base one’s
decision probabilities (or caring measure) on this preferred state (via the Born
rule) is at least simpler than Heretic’s proposal to begin with a different initial
state (systematically derived from the “correct” initial state).
However, there seem to be two difficulties with Greaves’s proposal.
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3.1.1 First difficulty: Naive Conditionalization
The first difficulty turns on the objection outlined at the beginning of this
section. Consider an agent who accepts the Everett view, and is interested
in testing or confirming an hypothesis about the initial state of a quantum
coin-tosser. He sets the device working, and sits down to record the results.
He observes Heads, reasons that Tails has occurred in the other branch, and
concludes that the total state of the world is exactly what he predicted it would
be, with certainty, before the experiment. Since this reasoning is insensitive to
the weight his hypothesis ascribes to Heads, his observations cannot bear on
that matter, no matter how much data he collects. But if the suggestion above
about the role of the principle of total evidence is correct, this is precisely the
kind of agent we ought to be. If so, then from an Everettian point of view, our
accumulated experimental data tells us very little about the “true” quantum
state.
Greaves considers a related point in a recent paper (Greaves 2006). Again,
her project is to argue that an orthodox epistemic updating rule works the
same in the Everett case as in conventional “one-world” QM (so that existing
experimental evidence provides the same degree of support for the orthodox
quantum state ascriptions). She considers an alternative updating policy –
‘Naive Conditionalization’, as she calls it – closely related to that of the agent
we have just considered.7
Naive Conditionalization rests on the thought that since the Everett view
implies that any measurement outcome with non-zero probability is bound to
occur in some branch,
every event that is quantum-mechanically possible, but not neces-
sary, confirms QME [i.e., the Everett view] at the expense of theories
that assign probability less than unity to that event. (2006, §4)
As Greaves points out,
[t]his result is not really surprising: what we have done, in construct-
ing Naive Conditionalization, is to give formal expression to the in-
tuition that disconfirmation of a theory occurs only when something
that, according to the theory in question, is improbable, occurs; and
(at the same time) that, according to QME, nothing is improbable
since everything is certain to occur.
She concludes:
This observation is (presumably!) a reductio of the suggestion that
Naive Conditionalization is the rational updating policy when branching-
universe theories are among those under consideration.
7The main difference is that Greaves is considering the case in which the Everett view itself
is treated as an hypothesis under consideration, rather than, as above, as a presupposition of
an hypothesis about the correct quantum weights in a particular measurement system.
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These are difficult issues, but it seems to me that Naive Conditionalization
has more to be said for it than Greaves allows. By way of analogy, consider
this variant of the Sleeping Beauty problem.8 An experimental subject, Beauty,
is informed that on the basis of a toss of a fair coin, she is to be assigned
to one of two test groups, H(eads) and T(ails), but not told which. She is
told that subjects in Group H will be put to sleep from Sunday evening to
the following Saturday morning, and will be woken once, on one of the five
intervening days; the particular day being chosen at random for each subject
individually. Subjects in Group T will also be put to sleep from Sunday evening
to the following Saturday morning, but will be woken on each intervening day;
and given a drug to ensure that they cannot remember previous wakings, if any.
Beauty wakes one morning, and discovers that it is Thursday. What credence
should she give to the proposition that she is in Group T?
There is strong intuitive appeal to the thought that since all of Group T
but only 20% of Group H find themselves in Beauty’s situation, the odds are
strongly in favour of her being in Group T. Yet the inference seems formally
parallel to Greaves’s Naive Conditionalization. Someone who wishes to reject
Naive Conditionalization needs either (i) to reject the corresponding inference
in the Sleeping Beauty case (arguing that Beauty should give credence 0.5 to
the proposition that she is in Group T); or (ii) to find some relevant epistemic
difference between the two cases.
To make the parallels more explicit, imagine a quantum-theoretic version
of the Sleeping Beauty experiment (the Sleeping QT experiment, perhaps). In
this case, both groups of subjects – HQ and TQ, let’s say – are woken only
once. In Group TQ only, however, the waking day is chosen for each subject
individually according to the result of a quantum measurement with five equally
weighted outcomes. (In Group HQ, perhaps, it is chosen by consulting some list
of effectively random numbers, fixed in advance, in such a way that all five
possibilities are equally likely, at least approximately.) In addition, subjects
are informed (or led to believe) that the Everett view is correct, and made to
understand the consequences, in the present case: in effect, each of the subjects
in Group TQ will branch into five descendants (or subsets of descendants), one
for each possible choice of waking day; whereas those in Group HQ will not
branch in this way.
A particular subject, Na¨if, wakes to find that it is Thursday. He follows
Beauty’s lead, reasoning that since it is five times less likely that the world
contains a Na¨if-waking-on-Thursday event if he is in Group HQ than if he is in
Group TQ, he is probably in the latter. What, if anything, has he got wrong?
9
It might be suggested that we should consider the case in which Na¨if doesn’t
8For the standard version of the problem, see Elga 2000, Lewis 2001, Vaidman and Saunders
2001, Dorr 2002, Arntzenius 2003, Horgan 2004 Weintraub 2004 and White 2006, for example.
I have modified the standard problem by removing a temporal asymmetry which is distracting
for present purposes, and by making the numbers bigger. (Thanks to Jenann Ismael for calling
my attention to the connection between Sleeping Beauty and the present issue.)
9For the sake of this issue, obviously, it doesn’t matter whether the Everett view is actually
correct. We are interested in how one should reason if one believes that it is correct.
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know immediately what day it is, when he wakes up. Then in either case –
whether he is in Group HQ or Group TQ – he seems correct to assign credence
0.2 to the possibility that it is Thursday.10 Doesn’t this suggest that at this
point, he has no reason to favour either hypothesis about which group he is in?
And if that’s right, then how could the discovery that it actually is Thursday
make such a difference? (After all, he knew in advance what the possibilities
were.)
But consider Beauty’s case. She, too, can be in this position of ignorance,
if she is not told what day it is, when she first wakes up. She, too, should
assign equal weight to all five possibilities. But this doesn’t mean that she has
no reason to favour the hypothesis that she is in Group T. On the contrary,
apparently, she knows that whatever the answer is, it favours the hypothesis
that she is in Group T – whatever day it is, her situation is five times more
likely to have arisen in Group T than in Group H. And the same goes for Na¨if,
or so it seems.11 He, too, can reason that whatever outcome he discovers when
he inspects the result of the experiment (i.e., when he discovers what day it is),
the existence of someone “in his shoes” discovering that outcome will be five
time more likely in Group TQ than in Group HQ.
The right diagnosis seems to be the following. It is true that at this point
in Na¨if’s deliberations – i.e., after he wakes up, but before he is told that it is
Thursday – P(Thursday|TQ) = P(Thursday|HQ), and hence that updating on
the new information that it is Thursday will make no further difference to his
rational credence in TQ and HQ. But by this point, his rational credences have
already been shifted in favour of TQ, by the discovery that on this day, whatever
it is, there is someone “in his shoes” who is awake. That state of affairs is much
more likely in Group TQ than in Group HQ. (Once again, the same diagnosis
seems to apply in Beauty’s case, mutatis mutandis.)
As I said, these are difficult matters, and they deserve a more detailed treat-
ment than I can give them here.12 Provisionally, however, it seems to me that
a case has been made for the claim that Naive Conditionalization is the correct
policy in the Everett world (or when the Everett view is one of the options). If
so, then Greaves may be right to conclude that this ‘is (presumably!) a reduc-
tio’, but wrong about the target of the reductio. The problem isn’t with Naive
Conditionalization – which is just ordinary conditionalization, applied in the
case in which the relevant conditional probabilities go to unity – but with the
Everett view itself. (In fact, it seems to precisely the kind of problem we would
expect anyway, if we were offered any more trivial theory which claimed to im-
ply that “all possibilities actually happen” – it doesn’t seem to be an advantage
10In the Group TQ case, of course, this depends on whether he is right to assign equal
credence to options with equal quantum amplitudes, but let’s let that pass, for now. For
the moment, the question is whether an Everettian agent who accepts the Born rule should
update according to probabilities it supplies – the Naive Conditionalizer says not.
11Except that in his case, as just noted, we still lack a reason for assigning particular values
to the ignorance-based probabilities.
12I’m grateful to Peter Lewis for showing me recent work in which he, too, has been exploring
the implications of Sleeping Beauty for Everett probabilities, and reaching similar conclusions;
see Lewis (2006).
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of such a theory that anything confirms it!)
Perhaps it is too strong to describe this as a reductio of the Everett pro-
posal.13 It may be more accurate to say that the upshot is only that the Everett
view belongs to a class of theories that are inevitably “pathological” with respect
to standard Bayesian confirmation. There’s then room for argument about the
significance of this fact.14 However, in case anyone is inclined to regard it as a
mark in favour of the Everett view that it gets “confirmed” so easily, it is worth
pointing out that the effect is independent of the Born probabilities. Hence it is
no help at all with the problem raised in the previous section, of giving physical
meaning to the state ascription.
3.1.2 Second difficulty: epistemology depends on decision
The second difficulty with Greaves’s proposal emerges in the light of the struc-
ture of the argument in this note. In effect, our first concern, in §2, offered a
sceptical conclusion about decision-theoretic reasoning in an Everett world. We
argued that from a decision-theoretic point of view, the Everett model provides
no sense in which – if we do allow our decision probabilities (or caring measure)
to be guided by the Born rule – we could think that one of a range of initial
states was any better than another, as the input to the Born rule. A sceptic
in the grip of this conclusion lacks any sense of what it means for a particular
choice of betting quotients to be “right”, or “appropriate”, over and above the
minimal consistency constraints required for coherence.15
The hope was to alleviate the sceptic’s decision-theoretic nihilism by ap-
pealing to the epistemology of the Everett interpretation. By Greaves’s path,
however, the relevant epistemology depends squarely on the decision theory.
The defence of conditionalization depends on a Dutch Book argument, just as
it does in the classical case; but the Dutch Book argument cannot get off the
ground, unless the agent concerned can be assumed to have betting quotients.
It is not clear that that’s true, of our Sceptic.
Thus the structure of the second difficulty for Greaves’s proposal is as follows:
in the present context, we need to make sense of the epistemology of the Everett
view, to provide a necessary foundation for its decision theory. But Greaves’s
route to the epistemology depends on a decision-theoretic argument. Hence it
seems inadmissable, as a solution to the sceptical difficulty identified in §2.
13Even if one agrees that Naive Conditionalization is the right policy, given the Everett
view.
14Compare the conclusion that a particular theory is unfalsifiable, in a Popperian sense.
Few people would regard this as an epistemological virtue, but it isn’t usually thought to be
a reductio, as such.
15Note that such a sceptic is not the same character as our Heretic from §2, who follows
an alternative to the Born rule. Heretic thinks that the Born rule is wrong, and proposes an
alternative. Sceptic – moved, perhaps, by consideration of Heretic’s case – claims to lack any
sense of what it means for the Born rule to be “right” or “wrong”.
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4 Conclusion
The two concerns above are related, apparently, because both stem from the
feature that Wallace identifies as the source of the unique power of the appeal to
symmetry in the Everett case, viz., that there is no unique outcome to spoil the
symmetry. In both cases, the objection is that in the absence of frequencies, that
feature inevitably severs the link between weights and outcomes, and puts all of
a wide class of assignments of weights on a par (predictively, for the purposes
of action, in the first case; and retrodictively, for the purpose of epistemology
and confirmation, in the second).
To give the penultimate word to Greaves herself,
the worry is this: it may be that if . . . we decide to understand
quantum mechanics along Everettian lines, . . . we lose the empirical
reason we had for believing quantum mechanics in the first place.
(2004, §2.2)
I’ve argued that this worry is more serious than Wallace and Greaves realise.
In the version of Everett to which they both subscribe, in which there are no
helpful facts about relative frequencies of branches, the internal symmetries of
quantum mechanics generate a fatal indeterminacy. The central ontological fact
of the Everett world, viz., the identity of the quantum state itself, seems to lose
practical and empirical significance, within wide margins.16
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